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Abstract. As massive data are produced from small gadgets, federated
learning on mobile devices has become an emerging trend. In the feder-
ated setting, Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) has been widely used
in federated learning for various machine learning models. To prevent
privacy leakages from gradients that are calculated on users’ sensitive
data, local differential privacy (LDP) has been considered as a privacy
guarantee in federated SGD recently. However, the existing solutions
have a dimension dependency problem: the injected noise is substantially
proportional to the dimension d. In this work, we propose a two-stage
framework FedSel for federated SGD under LDP to relieve this problem.
Our key idea is that not all dimensions are equally important so that
we privately select Top-k dimensions according to their contributions in
each iteration of federated SGD. Specifically, we propose three private
dimension selection mechanisms and adapt the gradient accumulation
technique to stabilize the learning process with noisy updates. We also
theoretically analyze privacy, accuracy and time complexity of FedSel,
which outperforms the state-of-the-art solutions. Experiments on real-
world and synthetic datasets verify the effectiveness and efficiency of our
framework.
Keywords: Local Differential Privacy · Federated Learning.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, massive peripheral gadgets, such as mobile phones and wearable de-
vices, produce an enormous volume of personal data, which boosts the process
of Federated Learning (FL). In the cardinal FL setting, Stochastic Gradient De-
scent (SGD) has been widely used [1–4] for various machine learning models,
such as Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machine and Neural Networks. The
server iteratively updates a global model for E epochs based on gradients of the
objective function, which are collected from batches of m clients’ d-dimensional
local updates. Nevertheless, users’ data are still under threats of privacy at-
tacks [5–8] if the raw gradients are transmitted to an untrusted server. Local
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Table 1. Overview Comparison (the number of epochs E, the dimension of a gradient
vector d, the compressed dimension q, the privacy budget for training , the amount of
participants in one aggregation m. See detailed analyses in Sects.3.1 and 4.2).
LDP-SGD solutions upper bound of noise lower bound of batch size
flat solution [12–14] O(E
√
d log d

√
m
) Ω(E
2d log d
2
)
compressed solution [9] O(E
√
q log q

√
m
) Ω(E
2q log q
2
)
our solution O(E
√
log d

√
md
) Ω(E
2 log d
d2
)
differential privacy (LDP) provides a rigorous guarantee to perturb users’ sen-
sitive data before sending to an untrusted server. Many LDP mechanisms have
been proposed for different computational tasks or data types, such as matrix
factorization [9], key-valued data [10,11] and multidimensional data [12–16].
However, applying LDP to federated SGD faces a nontrivial challenge when
the dimension d is large. First, although some LDP mechanisms [12–14] proposed
for multidimensional data are shown to be applicable to SGD (i.e., flat solution
in Table 1), the injected noise is substantially proportional to the dimension d.
Besides, in order to obtain an acceptable accuracy, the required batch size of
clients (i.e., m) linearly depends on d. As the clients in federated learning have
the full autonomy for their local data and can decide when and how to join the
training process, a large required batch size impedes the model’s applicability in
practice. Second, a recent work [9] (i.e., compressed solution in Table 1) attempts
to solve this problem by reducing the dimension from d to q with random pro-
jection [17], which is a well-studied dimension reduction technique. However, as
this method randomly discards some dimensions, it introduces a large recovery
error which may damage the learning performance.
Our idea is that not all the dimensions are equally “important” so that
we privately select Top-k dimensions according to their contributions (i.e., the
absolute values of gradients) in each iteration of SGD. A simple method for
private Top-1 selection is to employ exponential mechanism [18] that returns a
private dimension with a probability proportional to its absolute value of gradi-
ent. However, the challenge is how to design Top-k selection mechanisms under
LDP for federated SGD with better selection strategies. Besides the absence of
such private Top-k selection mechanisms, another challenge is that discarding
delayed gradients causes the convergence issues, especially in our private setting
where extra noises are injected. Although we can accumulate delayed gradients
with momentum [19], it still requires additional design to stabilize the learning
process with noisy updates.
Contributions: In this work, we take the first attempt to mitigate the
dimension dependency problem in federated learning with LDP. We design, im-
plement and evaluate a two-stage -LDP framework for federated SGD. As shown
in Table 1, comparing to the state-of-the-art techniques, our framework relieves
the effect of the number of dimensions d on the injected noise and the required
batch size (i.e., size of clients in each iteration; the lower, the better). Our con-
tributions are summarized below.
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– First, we propose a two-stage framework FedSel with Dimension Selection
and Value Perturbation. With our privacy analysis in Sect.3.2, this frame-
work satisfies -LDP for any client’s local vector. Our theoretical utility
analysis in Sect.3.3 shows that it significantly reduces the dimensional de-
pendency on LDP estimation error fromO(
√
d) toO(1/
√
d). We also enhance
the framework to avoid the loss of accuracy by accumulating delayed gra-
dients. Intuitively, delayed gradients can improve the empirical performance
and fix the convergence issues. In order to further stabilize the learning in the
private setting with noises injected, we modify an existing accumulation [19].
Our analysis and experiments validate that this modification reduces the
variance of noisy updates. (Section 3)
– Second, we instantiate the Dimension Selection stage with three mecha-
nisms, which are general and independent of the second stage of value per-
turbation. The privacy guarantee for the selection is provided. Besides, we
show the advance of utility and computation cost by extending Top-1 to
Top-k case with analysis and experiments. (Section 4)
– Finally, we perform extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets
to evaluate the proposed framework and the private Top-k dimension selec-
tion mechanisms. We also implement a hyper-parameters-free strategy to
automatically allocate the privacy budgets between the two stages with bet-
ter utility. Significant improvements are shown in test accuracy comparing
with the existing solutions [9, 12–14]. (Section 5)
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
technical background. Section 3 illustrates the two-stage privatized framework
with analyses. Section 4 proposes the Exponential Mechanism (EXP) for Top-1
selection and extends to Top-k case with Perturbed Encoding Mechanism (PE)
and Perturbed Sampling Mechanism (PS). Section 5 provides results on both
synthetic and real-world datasets and a hyper-parameters-free strategy. Section
6 gives an overview of related works. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Federated SGD
Suppose a learning task defines the objective loss function L(w;x, y) on example
(x, y) with parameters w ∈ Rd. The goal of learning is to construct an empirical
minimization as w∗ = arg minw 1N
∑N
i=1 L(w;xi, yi) over N clients’ data. For
a single iteration, a batch of m clients updates local models in parallel with
the distributed global parameters. Then they transmit local model updates to
the server for an average mean gradient to update the global model as: wt ←
wt−1 − α 1m
∑m
i=15L(wt−1;xi, yi). Without loss of generality, we describe our
framework with the classic setting with one local update for each round.
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2.2 Local Differential Privacy
Local differential privacy (LDP) is proposed for collecting sensitive data through
local perturbations without any assumption on a trusted server.M is a random-
ized algorithm that takes a vector v as input and outputs a perturbed vector v∗.
-LDP is defined on M with a privacy budget  as follows.
Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy [20]). A randomized algorithmM
satisfies -LDP if and only if the following is true for any two possible inputs
v, v′ ∈ V and output v∗: Pr[M(v) = v∗] ≤ e · Pr[M(v′) = v∗].
2.3 Problem Definition
This paper studies the problem of federated SGD with LDP. Note that in the
practical non-private setting, the original gradient gt ← 5L(wt−1;x, y) can be
sparsified [21] or quantized [22] before a transmission. For generality, we do not
limit the form of local gradient and use vi to denote the local gradient calculated
from client ui’s record (xi, yi) and the global parameters w
t−1.
Suppose the global model iterates for E epochs with a learning rate α and a
total privacy budget  for each client. For a single epoch, clients are partitioned
into batches with size m. Then the privatized mechanism M privatizes m local
updates before they are aggregated by the untrusted server for one iteration. The
global model is updated as: wt ← wt−1−α 1m
∑m
i=1M(vi). We aim to propose an
-LDP framework with a specialized mechanismM for private federated training
against the untrusted server. Moreover, we attempt to mitigate the dimension
dependency problem for a higher accuracy.
3 Two-stage LDP Framework: FedSel
In this section, we propose a two-stage framework FedSel with dimension selec-
tion and value perturbation as shown in Fig.1. The framework and differences
from existing works are presented in Sect.3.1. We prove the privacy guarantee
in Sect.3.2 and analyze the stability improvement in Sect.3.3.
3.1 Overview
We now illustrate the proposed framework in Algorithm 1 and compare it with
the flat solutions [12–14] and the compressed solution [9]. In our framework, the
server first initiates the ratio µ ∈ [0, 1] for privacy budget allocation and starts
the iteration. For the procedure on a local device: (i) Current gradient gt is
accumulated with previously delayed gradients rt−1 (line 15). (ii) An important
dimension index is privately selected by Dimension Selection (line 16). (iii)
The value of the selected dimension plus its momentum (line 17) is perturbed by
Value Perturbation (line 18). The accumulation in step(i) and the momentum
in step(iii) derive from the work of Sun et al. [19] to compress local gradient
with little loss of accuracy and memory cost. We adapt the accumulation in
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Fig. 1. Two-stage LDP framework.
Algorithm 1 Two-stage LDP framework of federated learning
E,N,m, µ, α,  for the server; 1, 2, η, k for N clients;
GlobalUpdate:
1: initialize t = 1, w0, r0i ← {0}d for i ∈ [N ]
2: µ← HyperParametersFree(m, , d)
3: initialize ′ = /E, 1 = µ · ′, 2 = ′ − 1
4: for each epoch 1, · · · , E do
5: for each sample batch with size m do
6: initialize G as an empty set
7: for each client do
8: s∗ ← LocalUpdate(wt−1, 1, 2, η, k)
9: add s∗ to G
10: s˜← 1
m
·∑s∗∈G s∗ # aggregation
11: wt ← wt−1 − αs˜, t = t+ 1
12: return final global model w
LocalUpdate: (wt−1, 1, 2, η, k)
13: initialize s∗ ← {0}d
14: gt ←5L(wt−1;x, y)
15: rt ← rt−1 + gt # adapted accumulation
16: j ← SelectOracle(rt, k, 1)
17: sj ← rtj + ηrt−1j
18: s∗j ← ValuePerturbation(sj , 2), rtj ← 0
19: return s∗
our framework to stabilize the iteration with noises. The step(ii) is designed to
alleviate the dimensional bottleneck and we analyze the improvement of accuracy
in Sect.4.2.
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Comparison with existing works. The most significant difference from exist-
ing works is the way of deciding which dimension to upload. In the flat solution,
each client randomly samples and perturbs c dimensions from d. the perturbed
value is enlarged by d/c for an unbiased mean estimation. Thus, the injected
noise is also amplified. For the compressed solution, d dimensions of the gra-
dient g is reduced to q dimensions by multiplying the vector g with a public
random matrix Φd×q drawn from the Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and
variance 1/q. Then an index is randomly sampled from q dimensions with its
value perturbed. The estimated mean of compressed vector is then approximately
recovered with the pseudo-inverse of Φ. Even if the random projection has the
strict isometry property, it ignores the meaning of the gradient magnitude and
brings recovery error. Our framework differs the compressed solution because we
utilize the magnitude property for gradient value.
3.2 Privacy Guarantee
In Algorithm 1, both the local accumulated vector r and the vector with mo-
mentum s are true local vectors that are directly calculated from the private
data. So we abuse v ∈ Rd to denote them in the following statement. As previ-
ously defined by Shokri et al. [23], there are two sources of information that we
intend to preserve for the local vector: (i) how a dimension is selected and (ii)
the value of the selected dimension. Let z = {0, 1}d indicate the ground-truth
Top-k status. We decompose the protection goal into following privacy defini-
tions for dimension selection and value perturbation. When combining the two
stages together, we can provide an -LDP guarantee with Theorem 1.
Definition 2 (LDP Dimension Selection). A randomized dimension selec-
tion algorithm M1 satisfies 1−LDP if and only if for any two status vectors
z, z′ ∈ {0, 1}d and any output j ∈ [d]: Pr[M1(z) = j] ≤ e1 · Pr[M1(z′) = j].
Definition 3 (LDP Value Perturbation). A randomized value perturbation
algorithm M2 satisfies 2−LDP if and only if for any two numeric values vj , v′j
and any output v∗j : Pr[M2(vj) = v∗j ] ≤ e2 · Pr[M2(v′j) = v∗j ].
Theorem 1. For a true local vector v, if the two-stage mechanism M first se-
lects a dimension index j with M1 and then perturbs vj with M2 under 1-LDP
and 2-LDP respectively, M satisfies (1 + 2)-LDP.
proof. Theorem 1 stands only when for any two possible local vectors v, v′, the
conditional probabilities for M to give the same output v∗ satisfy the following
condition: Pr[v∗|v] ≤ e1+2Pr[v∗|v′]. Let z, z′ denote selection status vectors
of v, v′. As we are considering the case where v, v′ have the same output v∗, we
end the proof with:
Pr[v∗|v]
Pr[v∗|v′] =
Pr[z|v]Pr[j|z]Pr[v∗j |vj ]
Pr[z′|v′]Pr[j|z′]Pr[v∗j |v′j ]
≤ Pr[z|v]
Pr[z′|v′] · e
1e2 = e(1+2).
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3.3 Variance Analysis for Accumulation
In the existing non-private gradients accumulation [19,21,24,25], local vectors are
accumulated as rt = rt−1+αgt. We adapt it to rt = rt−1+gt and scale it with the
learning rate in line 11. This aims to reduce the variance of noisy local updates
and stabilize the iteration. Suppose the jth dimension of a gradient is selected
after T rounds of delay, and si,j denotes the gradient value. In each iteration of
Algorithm 1, the update for the global parameter wj from user ui is denoted as
4Twi,j = αms∗i,j . If αg is accumulated [19], the update is 4′Twi,j = 1m (αsi,j)∗.
For LDP mechanisms of mean estimation, the input range is [−1, 1]. Thus
all inputs for a perturbation mechanism should be clipped to the defined input
range. When the value for the selected dimension is in the input range, we can
easily have: V ar[4Twi,j ] = V ar[4′Twi,j ]. It should be noted that our selected
gradient value has significantly larger magnitude. When initial values of both
cases are clipped to the input domain, we define the clipped input as ξ. Then
we have: V ar[4Twi,j ] = α2m2V ar[ξ∗], V ar[4′Twi,j ] = 1m2V ar[ξ∗]. As the learning
rate α is typically smaller than 1, such as 0.1, we then have Theorem 2. Therefore,
the slight adaption of scaling procedure can reduce the variance of single client’s
noisy update. The advance of a smaller variance will lead to a more accurate
learning performance as validated in the experimental part, Fig.3(a).
Theorem 2. Accumulating g instead of αg for the dimension j of user ui has
an update on the global model’s parameter with a less variance:
V ar[4Twi,j ] ≤ V ar[4′Twi,j ], where α ∈ (0, 1).
4 Private Dimension Selection
To instantiate the 1-LDP dimension selection in Algorithm 1 line 16, we design
LDP mechanisms from Top-1 to Top-k case. Then, we analyze the accuracy and
time complexity of proposed LDP mechanisms.
4.1 Selection Mechanisms
Exponential Mechanism (EXP): Exponential mechanism [18] is a natural
building block for selecting private non-numeric data in the centralized differen-
tial privacy. We modify this classic method to meet the selection requirement.
A client’s accumulated vector r is first sorted in ascending order of its absolute
value. As a special case for Top-1 selection, the status vector in EXP is defined
as: z = {1, · · · , d}d instead of a binary vector. Intuitively, the dimension with the
largest magnitude of its absolute value should be output with the highest prob-
ability. For the jth dimension, we assign the selection status as its ranking zj .
Thus, the index j ∈ [d] is sampled unevenly with the probability exp(
1zj
d−1 )∑d
i=1 exp(
1zi
d−1 )
.
The privacy guarantee is shown in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. EXP selection is 1−locally differentially private.
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proof. Given any two possible ranking vectors as z, z′ ∈ {1, · · · , d}d. j denotes
any output index of EXP. The following conditional probability ends the proof:
Pr[j|z]
Pr[j|z′] =
exp(
1zj
d−1 )∑d
i=1 exp(
1zi
d−1 )
/
exp(
1z
′
j
d−1 )∑d
i=1 exp(
1z′i
d−1 )
≤ exp(
1·d
d−1 )
exp( 1·1d−1 )
= e
1(d−1)
d−1 = e1 .
In order to fit various learning tasks, k should be tunable. Thus, we propose
two private Top-k methods to better control the selection.
Perturbed Encoding Mechanism (PE): The sorting step for the vector of
absolute values |r| in PE is the same as in EXP. Besides, a binary Top-k status
vector z is derived. Then we perturb the vector z with the randomized response.
Specifically, each status has a large probability p to retain its value and a small
probability 1− p to flip. For the privacy guarantee, p = e1e1+1 . Let z´ denote the
privatized status vector. Since indices of non-zero elements in z´ are more likely
to be Top-k dimensions, we gather these elements as the sample set S. If S is
empty, the client uploads ⊥ and the server regards it as receiving a zero vector
s∗ = {0}d. Elsewise the client randomly samples one dimension index from S.
The privacy guarantee is shown in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. PE selection is 1−locally differentially private.
proof. z´ denotes the perturbed status vector. The expected sparsity of z´ is:
l =E[||z´||0] =
d∑
j=1
Pr[z´j = 1|zj ] =
k∑
j=1
Pr[z´j = 1|zj = 1] +
d∑
j=k+1
Pr[z´j = 1|zj = 0]
=k · p+ (d− k) · (1− p), where p = e
1
e1 + 1
.
Given any two possible selection status vectors as z, z′ ∈ {0, 1}d with k non-zero
elements, there are two cases for the output j:(i) If the sample set S is not empty,
j ∈ S. (ii) If the sample set S is empty, j = ⊥. For the first case, we have:
Pr[j|z]
Pr[j|z′] =
1
l Pr[z´j = 1|z]
1
l Pr[z´
′
j = 1|z′]
≤
1
l Pr[z´j = 1|zj = 1]
1
l Pr[z´
′
j = 1|z′j = 0]
=
e1
e1 + 1
/
1
e1 + 1
= e1 .
For the second case, we end the proof with the conditional probability:
Pr[j = ⊥|z]
Pr[j = ⊥|z′] =
(1− p)k · pd−k
(1− p)k · pd−k
= 1 ≤e1 (for 1 ≥ 0)
Perturbed Sampling Mechanism (PS): PS selection has the same criterion
as PE that regards Top-k as important dimensions. Intuitively, we define a higher
probability p to sample an index j from the Top-k indices set {j ∈ [d]|zj = 1}
and elsewise, sample an index j from non-Top-k dimensions {j ∈ [d]|zj = 0}
with a smaller probability 1 − p. With the privacy guarantee in Lemma 3, we
define p = e
1 ·k
d−k+e1 ·k .
Lemma 3. PS selection is 1−locally differentially private.
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proof. Given any two possible Top-k status vector z, z′ and any output index
j ∈ {1, · · · , d}, the following conditional probability ends the proof:
Pr[j|z]
Pr[j|z′] ≤
Pr[j|zj = 1]
Pr[j|z′j = 0]
=
p 1k
(1− p) 1d−k
= e1 ,where p =
e1k
d− k + e1 · k .
4.2 Analyses of Accuracy and Time Complexity
We analyze the accuracy improvement of the proposed two-stage framework by
evaluating the error bound in Theorem 3 which stands independently of value
perturbation algorithms in the second stage. The amount of noise in the average
vector is O(
√
log d
2
√
md
) and the acceptable batch size is |m| = Ω( log d
d22
) which does
not increase linearly with d. Since 2 = 
′(1 − µ) and ′ = /E, it is evident
that Ω(E2 log d/d2) < Ω(E2d log d/2) for µ < 0.5. Hence, we can improve the
accuracy while keeping the same private guarante. It also reminds us to allocate
a small portion of privacy budget to the dimension selection.
Theorem 3. For any j ∈ [d], let s˜ = 1m
∑
s∗∈G s
∗. X = 1m
∑
s∗∈G s denotes the
mean of true sparse vectors without perturbations. With 1− β probability,
max
j∈[1,d]
|s˜j −Xj | = O(
√
log d/β
2
√
md
).
Compared with the non-private setting, LDP brings extra computation costs
for local devices. For EXP, different utility scores and the summation can be ini-
tialized offline. Sorting a d−dimensional vector consumes O(d log d). Mapping all
d dimensions to according utility values consumes O(d2) and sampling requires
O(d). Thus, each local device has extra time cost O(d log d+d2 +d) = O(d2) for
EXP. With a similar analysis, the extra time cost for PE is O(d log d+ d+ l) =
O(d log d) which is less than the time complexity O(d2) of EXP. Since PS avoids
the perturbation for each dimension, it has a slightly less computation cost than
PE with the magnitude of O(d log d). We validate this conclusion in experiments.
5 Experiments
In this section, we assess the performance of our proposed framework on real-
world and synthetic datasets. We first evaluate our selection methods without
the second stage of value perturbation. To evaluate the improvement of reducing
injected noises, we compare the learning performance with the state-of-the-art
works [9, 13, 14] and validate theoretical conclusions in Sects.3.3 and 4.2. More-
over, we implement a hyper-parameters-free strategy that automatically initiates
the budget allocation ratio µ to fit scenarios with dynamic population sizes.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets and Benchmarks. For the convenience to control data sparsity, the
synthetic data is generated with the existing procedure [26] with two param-
eters C1 = {0.01, 0.1}, C2 = {0.6, 0.9} and dimensions {100(syn-L), 300(syn-
H)} over {60,000, 100,000} records. The over real-world benchmark datasets
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Table 2. Frameworks and Variants for Comparisons.
solution abbreviation sparsification perturbation budget
non-private NP full/random/topk - ∞
flat [13,14] PM/HM/Duchi random sampling ′ ′
compressed [9] -RP random projection ′ ′
two-stage EXP/PE/PS- 1 = µ · ′ 2 = ′ − 1 ′
includes BANK, ADULT, KDD99 which have {32, 123, 114} dimensions over
{45,211, 48,842, 70,000} records. We follow a typical pre-process procedure in
machine learning with one-hot-encoding every categorical attribute. We test on
l2-regularized Logistic Regression and Support Vector Machine.
Choices of Parameters. Since we observe that models on the above datasets
can converge within 100 rounds of iterations, we set the batch size for one global
model’s iteration as m = 0.01 ·N . We report the average accuracy or misclassi-
fication rates of 10 times 5-folds cross-validations for one epoch unless otherwise
stated. The discounting factor η and learning rate α are same in each case for a
fair comparison. We set k = 0.1d, µ = 0.1, λ = 0.0001 by default.
Comparisons with Competitors. The proposed FedSel framework is prefixed
with selection mechanisms EXP/PE/PS. We compare it with non-private base-
lines (NP) of three different transmitting methods (-/RS/K): full gradient, ran-
dom sampled dimension, Top-k(k = 1) selection. We also compare with the flat
solution [13,14] and the compressed solution [9] with random sampling and ran-
dom projection respectively before perturbing the value. Due to limited space
and variant baselines, we mainly demonstrate comparisons with the optimal
competitor PM and show comparisons with other competitors in Fig.2(i) and
Fig.2(h). Abbreviations of different variants are listed in Table 2.
5.2 Evaluation of the Dimension Selection
Convergence and Accuracy. We compare EXP/PE/PS with non-private
baselines of NP, NP-RS and NP-K by visualizing the misclassification rate and
accuracy of test set in Fig.2(a) to Fig.2(d). Note that this comparison only fo-
cuses on selection without the second stage of value perturbation. For NP-RS,
we enlarge the value randomly sampled by each user for an unbiased estimation.
This follows the same principle in the flat or compressed solution.
The advance of NP-K compared with NP-RS shows our essential motiva-
tion that Top-k is a more effective and accurate way to reduce the transmitted
dimension. On 100-dimensional dataset, NP-K even approaches the full-gradient-
uploading baseline NP in Fig.2(a). Besides, EXP/PE/PS converge more stable
and faster than NP-RS in Fig.2(a) and Fig.2(b) with 1 = 4. With a larger pri-
vacy budget, there is a trend for EXP/PE/PS to approach the same accuracy
performance as the NP-K(k = 1) in Fig.2(c) and Fig.2(d). Moreover, even a
small budget in dimension selection helps to increase the learning accuracy. We
can also observe that PE and PS methods which intuitively intend to select from
FedSel: Federated SGD under LDP with Top-k Dimension Selection 11
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Fig. 2. Improvements of the two-stage framework and dimension selection.
the Top-k list have a better performance than EXP. Thus, our extension from
Top-1 to Top-k is necessary.
Validation of Complexity Analysis. Here we analyze the time consumption
for each client per transmission in Fig.2(e). The time is counted by iterating
over synthetic datasets with variant dimensions from 10 to 10,000. We observe
that the selection stage indeed incurs extra computation cost. Consistent with
previous analysis in Sect.4.2, PS has the lowest computation cost.
5.3 Effectiveness of the Two-stage Framework
Comparison with Existing Solutions. We compare the learning performance
for EXP/PE/PS-PM with the flat solution PM/HM/Duchi [13,14] and the com-
pressed solution [9]. Remark that we set control groups with postfix ”-C” in
Fig.2(f) and Fig.2(g) by allocating 1 for dimension selection and 
′ for value
perturbation. To further elucidate the trade-off between what we gain and what
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Table 3. Gains and Losses on Accuracy for Private Selection with  = 2 (%).
dataset model EXP-gain EXP-loss PE-gain PE-loss PS-gain PS-loss
syn-L-0.01-0.9 logistic 8.6074 0.3517 5.410 1.192 5.975 0.4970
syn-L-0.01-0.9 SVM 7.1950 2.1593 3.7704 0.8533 5.065 2.0816
BANK logistic 2.4197 -0.157 3.2338 0.0464 2.5525 0.1463
BANK SVM 4.3823 0.4436 3.4369 0.2530 4.0244 0.0164
KDD logistic 2.0471 0.5091 2.5148 0.2322 2.0171 0.3428
KDD SVM 1.85629 -0.1625 2.2168 0.2288 1.8291 0.4465
ADULT logistic 5.5745 0.2935 5.6445 1.3096 6.0535 0.8091
ADULT SVM 5.5361 0.1949 5.6057 0.9550 5.1442 0.3852
we lose, we qualify the benefit of private selection with the gap between the
accuracy as the following, which is shown as Table 3. It is evident that what we
gain is much larger than what we lose. This is because when we have enough
privacy budget for value perturbation, increasing budget for value perturbation
is not comparable to allocating surplus budget to privacy selection.
gain = acc(EXP/PE/PS-PM-C)− acc(PM),
loss = acc(EXP/PE/PS-PM-C)− acc(EXP/PE/PS-PM).
From Fig.2(f) and Fig.2(g), we observe that proposed two-stage solutions
have higher test accuracy than the optimal private baseline PM on both mod-
els and all datasets. Given enough privacy budget on relatively low-dimensional
datasets, proposed solutions even outperform the non-private baseline in Fig.2(f).
The key to this success is the inherent randomness in SGD. The slightly intro-
duced stochasticity for privacy-preserving prevents the overfitting problem. In
Fig.2(g) with results of two epochs, our adapted local accumulation with mo-
mentum helps to reduce the impact of noisy gradients compared with the private
baseline PM, especially when ′ is small.
From Fig.2(h), we show a comparison with flat solutions of other pertur-
bation methods which have the same optimal error bound as PM. Note that
the value perturbation algorithms for each pair of comparison in Fig.2(h) is the
same and only differ in the selection stage. It is evident that our framework has
a lower misclassification rate and standard deviation over 50 times tests. There-
fore, we can conclude that this improvement is independent of value perturbation
methods. We omit the comparison of EXP and PE for the same conclusion.
In Fig.2(i), we compare with the compressed solution [9] with the same
comparison ratio 0.1. The originally apply random projection in gradients of
the Matrix Factorization and use another value perturbation method [12]. Since
the dimension reduction idea is independent of value perturbation, for fairness
comparison, we adopt the random projection idea and use the same method
PM [13] to perturb value when implementing the competitor PM-RP. Our result
shows that, even the error bound is reduced by random projection, the recovery
error ruins the accuracy while our dimension selection still works.
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Fig. 3. Improvement of the adapted accumulation and impacts of µ
Effectiveness of the Adapted Accumulation. We validate the improvement of
stability consistent with our analysis in Sect.3.3 in Fig.3(a). We set the variant
of accumulating αg as the competitor (EXP/PE/PS-PM-O). The result shows
accumulating αg directly will not improve the learning performance because
what we gain by selection is offset by the larger turbulence. Thus, our adaptation
is necessary for better compatibility with the private context.
Impacts of µ. As µ ∈ [0, 1] controls the privacy budget allocation in our
two-stage framework, we evaluate µ in Fig.3(b) with ADULT dataset while the
same trends are found in other datasets. From Fig.3(b), we observe that our
framework with a small µ works no worse than the flat competitor, even when
the total budget is small. In addition, µ = 0.1 gives an optimal learning accuracy,
and µ = 0.8 leads to a worse performance with a higher misclassification rate and
a significant standard deviation as expected. Thus, µ is an essential parameter
that controls the trade-off between what we gain and what we lose.
The divergence of a large µ reminds us that a safe maximum threshold θ
is required to guarantee this trade-off always benefits the model’s accuracy. It
is much easier to tune θ than µ as θ can be tested on synthetic datasets inde-
pendently of total privacy budget and batch size. At the beginning of training,
given the privacy budget per epoch ′, the model’s dimension d, the available
batch size m, our principle is to first allocate at least 2 = Ω(
√
d log d/m) to the
second stage. Then extra privacy budget can be allocated for dimension selection
to improve the accuracy as a bonus.
In Fig.3(c), we set a safe threshold as θ = 0.2 empirically and validate
the effectiveness of the proposed hyper-parameters-free strategy. Different batch
sizes shown in the x-axis simulate the dynamic amount of participants when
initiating a distributed learning task in practice. For the fairness to compare the
test set accuracy with different batch sizes, we stop the learning process within
the same number of iterations. We observe that the proposed solution with
three dimension selection methods under this strategy significantly improve the
model’s accuracy. Besides, the proposed hyper-parameters-free strategy works
steadily for dynamic batch sizes as the deviations among all 50 times tests are
smaller than the private baseline.
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6 Related Works
How we select the dimension and accumulate gradients are based on the well-
studied gradient sparsification in the non-private setting. Strom et al. [27] pro-
pose only to upload dimensions with absolute values larger than a threshold.
Instead of a fixed threshold, Aji et al. [25] introduce Gradient Dropping (GD)
which sorts absolute values first and dropping a fixed portion of gradients. Wang
et al. [26] drop gradients by trading off between the sparsity and variance. Al-
istarh et al. [21] show the theoretical convergence for Top-k selection. However,
even if the gradient update is compressed, there still exist privacy risks because
it is calculated directly with local data.
If local gradients are transmitted in clear, the untrusted server threatens
clients’ privacy. Nasr et al. [6] present the membership inference by only observ-
ing uploads or controlling the view of each participant. Wang et al. [8] propose a
reconstruction attack in which the server can recover a specific user’s local data
with Generative adversarial nets (GANs). Secure attack [28] in FL is also an
important topic but we focus on private issues in this paper.
Cryptography technologies face a bottleneck of heavy communication and
computation costs. Bonawits et al. [29] present an implementation of Secure Ag-
gregation, which entails four rounds interacts per iteration and several costs grow
quadratically with the number of users. As for differential privacy(DP) [18] in
distributed SGD, Shokri et al. [23] propose a asynchronous cooperative learning
with privately selective SGD by sparse vector technique. It may lose accuracy
as it drops delayed gradients instead of accumulating as our works. Agarwal et
al. [30] combine gradient quantization and differential private mechanisms in syn-
chronous setting, but it requires a higher communication cost for d-dimensional
vector. It should be noticed that the privacy definition in the above works differ-
entiate from LDP as it provides the plausible deniability for only single gradient
value while LDP guarantees the whole gradient vector to be indistinguishable.
Many LDP techniques are proposed for categorical or numeric values. Ran-
domized response (RR) method [31] is the classic method to perturb binary
variables. Kairouz et al. [32] introduce a family of extremal privatization mech-
anisms k-RR to categorical attributes. With LDP mechanisms for mean estima-
tion, Duchi et al. [14] suggest that LDP leads to an effective degradation in batch
size. Wang et al. [13] show that compared with Duchi et al.’s work, their mean
estimation mechanisms with lower worst-case variance lead to a lower misclassi-
fication rate when applied in SGD. Considering the required batch size is linearly
dependent on the dimension, Bhowmick et al. [33] design LDP mechanisms for
reconstruction attack with a large magnitude of privacy budget to get rid of the
utility limitation of a normal locally differentially private learning.
7 Conclusions
This paper proposes a two-stage LDP privatization framework FedSel for fed-
erated SGD. The key idea takes the first attempt to mitigate the dimension
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problem in injected noises by delaying unimportant gradients. We further stabi-
lize the global iteration by modifying the accumulation with a smaller variance
on the noisy update. The improvement of proposed methods is theoretically an-
alyzed and validated in experiments. The framework with hyper-parameters-free
also outperforms baselines over variant batch sizes. In future work, we plan to
formalize the optimal trade-off for utility and accuracy and extend FedSel to a
more general case.
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1.A Analysis of Accuracy
proof. for Theorem 3: For any j ∈ [1, d], the estimated mean of perturbed
sparse vectors is s˜ = 1m
∑
s∗∈G s
∗. The mean of the sparse vectors without value
perturbation is denoted as X = 1m
∑
s∗∈G s. For any i ∈ [1,m], perturbation
method is unbiased, s∗i,j − si,j has zero mean. Given privacy budget 2 for value
perturbation with the asymptotically optimal error bound, we have the upper
bound for |s∗i,j − si,j | as O(1/2). Then we have:
Pr[|s˜j −Xj | ≥ λ]
=Pr[|
m∑
i
{s∗i,j − si,j}| ≥ mλ]
≤2 · exp (− (mλ)
2
2
∑m
i V ar[s
∗
i,j ] +
2
3mλ ·O(1/2)
) (1)
Let pi,j denote the probabilities for dimension j of user ui being selected by
a selection mechanism. ζ presents the output value of the value perturbation
algorithm, and we have E[ζ2] = O(1/22). Thus, the expectation of the variance
is shown as follows:
V ar[s∗i,j ] =E[(s∗i,j)2]− E[s∗i,j ]2
=pi,jE[ζ2]− (si,j)2. (2)
The probability of pi,j depends on whether j is in the Top-k list of ui’s local
vector. For selection mechanisms EXP, PE, PS, we have the upper bound of pi,j
dominated by O(1/d). Apply (2) to (1), we have:
Pr[|s˜j −Xj | ≥ λ] ≤ 2 · exp(− mλ
2
O(1/d22) + λ ·O(1/2)
).
By the union bound, there exists λ = O(
√
log d/β
2
√
md
) such that maxj∈[1,d] |s˜j−Xj | <
λ holds with at least 1− β probability.
1.B Pseudocode
Algorithm 2 Exponential Private SelectOracle (EXP)
Require: rt, 1
1: initialize sum←∑dj=1 exp( 1·jd−1 )
2: sort |rt| in ascending order
3: for j ∈ [d] do
4: zj ← the rank of dimension j
5: pj ← exp(
1·zj
d−1 )
sum
6: sample an index j ∈ [d] with probability pj
7: return j
18 R. Liu et al.
Algorithm 3 SelectOracle-Perturbed Encoding (PE)
Require: rt, k, 1
1: initialize z ← {0}d, p = e1
e1+1
2: sort |rt| and for j ∈ [d], set zj ← 1 if |rtj | ∈ Top-k
3: for j ∈ [d] do
4: if zj = 1 then
5: z´j ←
{
1, w.p. p
0, w.p. 1− p
6: else
7: z´j ←
{
1, w.p. 1− p
0, w.p. p
8: perturbed Top-k index list S = {j|z´j = 1, j ∈ [d]}
9: if S is empty then
10: return ⊥
11: else
12: sample a dimension j from S
13: return j
Algorithm 4 SelectOracle-Perturbed Sampling (PS)
Require: rt, k, 1
1: initialize z ← {0}d
2: sort |rt| and for j ∈ [d], set zj ← 1 if |rtj | ∈ Top-k
3: sample x uniformly at random from [0, 1]
4: if x < e
1 ·k
d−k+e1 ·k then
5: randomly sample an index j ∈ {j ∈ [d]|zj = 1}
6: else
7: randomly sample an index j ∈ {j ∈ [d]|zj = 0}
8: return j
